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Abstract
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs
correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses
a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such selfish behavior typically results in some
equilibrium which is not globally optimal : An equilibrium is an allocation where no user can
reduce her own cost by moving to another machine, which in general need not minimize the
makespan, i.e., the maximum load over the machines.
We provide tight bounds on two well-studied notions in algorithmic game theory, namely,
the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy on machine scheduling setting which lies
in between the related and the unrelated machine case. Both notions study the social cost
(makespan) of the worst equilibrium compared to the optimum, with the strong price of anarchy
restricting to a stronger form of equilibria. Our results extend a prior study comparing the
price of anarchy to the strong price of anarchy for two related machines (Epstein [13], Acta
Informatica 2010), thus providing further insights on the relation between these concepts. Our
exact bounds give a qualitative and quantitative comparison between the two models. The
bounds also show that the setting is indeed easier than the two unrelated machines: In the latter,
the strong price of anarchy is 2, while in ours it is strictly smaller.
1 Introduction
Scheduling jobs on unrelated machines is a classical optimization problem. In this problem, each
job has a (possibly different) processing time on each of the m machines, and a schedule is simply
an assignment of jobs to machines. For any such schedule, the load of a machine is the sum of all
processing times of the jobs assigned to that machine. The objective is to find a schedule minimizing
the makespan, that is, the maximum load among the machines.
In its game-theoretic version, jobs correspond to self-interested users who choose which machine
to use accordingly without any centralized control, and naturally aim at minimizing their own cost
(i.e. the load of the machine they choose). This will result in some equilibrium in which no player
has an incentive to deviate, though the resulting schedule is not necessarily the optimal in terms
of makespan. Indeed, even for two unrelated machines it is quite easy to find equilibria whose
makespan is arbitrarily larger than the optimum.
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Example 1 (bad equilibrium for two unrelated machines). Consider two jobs and two unrelated
machines, where the processing times are given by the following table:
job 1 job 2
machine 1 1 s
machine 2 s 1
The allocation represented by the gray box is a (pure Nash) equilibrium: if a job moves to the other
machine, its own cost increases from s to s+ 1. As the optimal makespan is 1 (swap the allocation),
even for two machines the ratio between the cost of the worst equilibrium and the optimum is
unbounded (at least s).
The inefficiency of equilibria in games is a central concept in algorithmic game theory, as it
quantifies the efficiency loss resulting from a selfish behavior of the players. In particular, the
following two notions received quite a lot of attention:
• Price of Anarchy (PoA) [22]. The price of anarchy is the ratio between cost of the worst Nash
equilibrium (NE) and the optimum.
• Strong Price of Anarchy (SPoA) [1]. The strong price of anarchy is the ratio between cost of
the worst strong Nash equilibrium (SE) with the optimum.
The only difference between the two notions is in the equilibrium concept: While in a Nash
equilibrium no player can unilaterally improve by deviating, in strong Nash equilibrium no group
of players can deviate and, in this way, all of them improve [4]. For instance, the allocation in
Example 1 is not a SE because the two players could change strategy and both will improve.
Several works pointed out that the price of anarchy may be too pessimistic because, even for two
unrelated machines, the price of anarchy is unbounded (see Example 1 above). Research thus focused
on providing bounds for the strong price of anarchy and comparing the two bounds according to
the problem restriction:
SPoA PoA
unrelated m ∞
m = 2 2 ∞
related Θ( logm
(log logm)2
) Θ( logmlog logm)
m = 2
√
5+1
2 ' 1.618
√
5+1
2 ' 1.618
m = 3 2
identical 2mm+1
2m
m+1
m = 2 4/3 4/3
In unrelated machines, each job can have different processing times on different machines. In related
machines, each job has a size and each machine a speed, and the processing time of a job on a
machine is the size of the job divided by the speed of the machine. For identical machines, the
processing time of a job is the same on all machines. The main difference between the identical
machines and the other cases is obviously that in the latter the processing times are different. For
two related machines, the worst bound of PoA and SPoA is achieved only when the speed ratio s
equals a specific value. Indeed, [13] characterize and compare the PoA and the SPoA for all values
of s, showing that SPoA < PoA only in a specific interval of values (see next section for details).
The lower bound on the PoA for two unrelated machines (Example 1) is unbounded when the ratio
between different processing time s is unbounded.
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Figure 1: Relationship between 2 related ma-
chines and our model.
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Figure 2: Comparison between PoA and SPoA
in our model and in two related machines [13].
1.1 Our contribution
Following the approach by [13] on two related machines, we study the price of anarchy and the
strong price of anarchy for the case of two machines though in a more general setting. Specifically,
we consider the case of jobs with favorite machines [7] which is defined as follows (see Figure 1).
Each job has a certain size and a favorite machine; The processing time of a job on its favorite
machine is just its size, while on any non-favorite machine it is s times slower, where s ≥ 1 is
common parameter across all jobs. This parameter is the speed ratio when considering the special
case of two related machines (see Figure 1). The model is also a restriction of unrelated machines
and the bad NE in Example 1 corresponds to two jobs of size one in our model. That is, when s in
unbounded, the price of anarchy is unbounded also in our model,
PoA ≥ s . (1)
This motivates the study of strong equilibria and SPoA in our setting. We provide exact bounds
on both the PoA and the SPoA for all values of s.
We first give an intuitive bound on SPoA which holds for all possible values of s.
Theorem 1. SPoA ≤ 1 + 1/s ≤ 2.
By a more detailed an involved analysis, we prove further tight bounds on SPoA.
Theorem 2. SPoA = ˆ`1, where (see the blue line in Figure 2)
ˆ`
1 =

s3+s2+s+1
s3+2
, 1 ≤ s ≤ s1 ≈ 1.325
s2+2s+1
2s+1 , s1 ≤ s ≤ s2 = 1+
√
5
2 ≈ 1.618
s+1
s , s2 ≤ s ≤ s3 ≈ 1.755
s3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1 , s3 ≤ s ≤ s4 ≈ 1.907
s+1
2 , s4 ≤ s ≤ s5 = 2
s2−s+1
s2−s , s5 ≤ s ≤ s6 ≈ 2.154
s2
2s−1 , s6 ≤ s ≤ s7 ≈ 2.247
s+1
s , s7 ≤ s .
At last we give exact bounds on the PoA, which show that the bound in (1) based on Example 1
is never the worst case.
Theorem 3. PoA = s
3+s2+s+1
s2+s+1
(see the orange line in Figure 2).
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These bounds express the dependency on the parameter s and suggest a natural comparison
with the case of two related machines (with the same s).
1.2 Related work
The bad Nash equilibrium in Example 1 appears in several works [1, 24, 10, 19] to show that even for
two machines the price of anarchy is unbounded, thus suggesting that the notion should be refined.
Among these, the strong price of anarchy, which considers strong NE, is studied in [1, 16, 13].
The sequential price of anarchy, which considers sequential equilibria arising in extensive form
games, is studied in [24, 6, 12, 19]. In [10] the authors investigate stochastically stable equilibria
and the resulting price of stochastic anarchy, while [20] focuses on the equilibria produced by the
multiplicative weights update algorithm. A further distinction is between mixed (randomized) and
pure (deterministic) equilibria: in the former, players choose a probability distribution over the
strategies and regard their expected cost, in the latter they choose deterministically one strategy.
In this work we focus on pure equilibria and in the remaining of this section we write mixed PoA to
denote the bounds on the price of anarchy for mixed equilibria.
The following bounds have been obtained for scheduling games:
• Unrelated machines. The PoA is unbounded even for two machines, while the SPoA is exactly
m, for any number m of machines [16, 1].
• Related machines. The price of anarchy is bounded for constant number of machines, and
grows otherwise. Specifically, mixed PoA = Θ( logmlog log logm) and PoA = Θ(
logm
log logm) [11], while
SPoA = Θ( logm
(log logm)2
) [16]. The case of a small number of machines is of particular interest.
For two and three machines, PoA =
√
5+1
2 and PoA = 2 [15], respectively. For two machines,
exact bounds as a function of the speed ratio s on both PoA and SPoA are given in [13].
• Restricted assignment. The price of anarchy bounds are similar to related machines: mixed
PoA = Θ( logmlog log logm) and PoA = Θ(
logm
log logm) [5], where the analysis of PoA is also in [18].
• Identical machines. The price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy for pure equilibria
are identical and bounded by a constant : PoA = SPoA = 2mm+1 [1], where the upper
and lower bounds on PoA can be deduced from [17] and [26], respectively. Finally, mixed
PoA = Θ( logmlog logm) [22, 11, 21].
For further results on other problems and variants of these equilibrium concepts we refer the reader
to e.g. [25, 9, 2, 8] and references therein.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model (favorite machines) and basic definitions
In unrelated machine scheduling, there are m machines and n jobs. Each job j has some processing
time pij on machine i. A schedule is an assignment of each job to some machine. The load of a
machine i is the sum of the processing times of the jobs assigned to machine i. The makespan is the
maximum load over all machines. In this work, we consider the restriction of jobs with favorite
machines: Each job j consists of a pair (sj , fj), where sj is the size of job j and fj is the favorite
4
machine of this job. For a common parameter s ≥ 1, the processing time of a job in a favorite
machine is just its size (pij = sj if i = fj), while on non-favorite machines is it s times slower
(pij = s · sj if i 6= fj).
We consider jobs as players whose cost is the load of the machine they choose: For an allocation
x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xj denotes the machine chosen by job j, and `i(x) =
∑
j:xj=i
pij is the
load of machine i. We say that x is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player j can unilaterally
deviate and improve her own cost, i.e., move to a machine xˆj such that `xˆj (xˆ) < `xj (x) where
xˆ = (x1, . . . , xˆj , . . . , xn) is the allocation resulting from j’s move. In a strong Nash equilibrium
(SE), we require that in any group of deviating players, at least one of them does not improve:
allocation x is a SE if, for any xˆ which differ in exactly a subset J of players, there is one j ∈ J
such that `xˆj (xˆ) ≥ `xj (x). The price of anarchy (PoA) is the worst-case ratio between the cost (i.e.,
makespan) of a NE and the optimum: PoA = maxx∈NE
C(x)
opt where C(x) = maxi `i(x) and NE is
the set of pure Nash equilibria. The strong price of anarchy (SPoA) is defined analogously w.r.t.
the set SE of strong Nash equilibria: SPoA = maxx∈SE
C(x)
opt .
2.2 First step of the analysis (reducing to eight groups of jobs)
To bound the strong price of anarchy we have to compare the worst SE with the optimum. The
analysis consists of two main parts. We first consider the subset of jobs that needs to be reallocated
in any allocation (or any SE) in order to obtain the optimum. It turns out that there are eight such
subsets of jobs, and essentially the analysis reduced to the cases of eight jobs only. We then exploit
the condition that possible reshuffling of these eight subsets must guarantee in order to be a SE.
We say that a job is good, for an allocation under consideration, if it is allocated to its favorite
machine. Otherwise the job is bad. Consider an allocation x and the optimum, respectively. As
shown in Figure 3, let
`1 = a1 + a2 + c1 + c2 and `2 = b1 + b2 + d1 + d2
be the load of machine 1 and machine 2 in allocation x, where a1 + a2 and b1 + b2 are load of bad
jobs and c1 + c2 and d1 +d2 are load of good jobs. Note that these quantities correspond to (possibly
empty) subsets of jobs. Without loss of generality suppose `1 ≥ `2, that is
C(x) = max(`1, `2) = `1 .
In the optimum, some of the jobs will be processed by different machine as in allocation x. Suppose
the jobs associated with a2, b2, c1 and d1 are the difference. Thus, the load of the two machines in
the optimum are
`∗1 = a1 + b2/s+ c2 + s · d1 and `∗2 = a2/s+ b1 + s · c1 + d2 .
an allocation x
bad job
good job
opt operation
optimum
1
2
c1 c2 a1 a2
d1 d2 b1 b2
1
2
c2
a2
sd2
b2
s
s c1
s d1
b1
a1
Figure 3: Comparing SE with the optimum.
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Remark 1. This setting can be also used to analyze PoA and SPoA for two related machines [13],
which corresponds to two special cases a1, a2, d1, d2 = 0 and b1, b2, c1, c2 = 0.
2.3 Conditions for SE
Without loss of generality we suppose opt = 1, i.e.,
`∗1 ≤ 1 , (2)
`∗2 ≤ 1 . (3)
Since allocation x is SE, we have that the minimum load in allocation x must be at most opt,
`2 ≤ 1 , (4)
because otherwise we could swap some of the jobs to obtain opt and in this will improve the cost of
all jobs.
Next, we shall provide several necessary conditions for allocation x to be a SE. Though these
conditions are only a subset of those that SE must satisfy, they will lead to tight bounds on the
SPoA.
1. No job in machine 1 will go to machine 2:
`1 ≤ `2 + a1/s , for a1 > 0 ; (5)
`1 ≤ `2 + a2/s , for a2 > 0 ; (6)
`1 ≤ `2 + s · c1 , for c1 > 0 ; (7)
`1 ≤ `2 + s · c2 , for c2 > 0 . (8)
2. No a2 - b2 swap:
`1 ≤ `2 − b2 + a2/s , (9)
or `2 ≤ `1 − a2 + b2/s . (10)
3. No a2 - d1 swap:
`1 ≤ `2 − d1 + a2/s , (11)
or `2 ≤ `1 − a2 + s · d1 . (12)
4. No a2 - {b1, d2} swap:
`1 ≤ `2 − b1 − d2 + a2/s , (13)
or `2 ≤ `1 − a2 + b1/s+ s · d2 . (14)
5. No {a2, c2} - {b1, b2, d1, d2} swap:
`1 ≤ a2/s+ c2 · s , (15)
or `2 ≤ a1 + c1 + (b1 + b2)/s+ s(d1 + d2) . (16)
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6. No {a1, a2, c1, c2} - {b1, b2, d1, d2} swap:
`1 ≤ (a1 + a2)/s+ s(c1 + c2) , (17)
or `2 ≤ (b1 + b2)/s+ s(d1 + d2) . (18)
3 Strong Price of Anarchy
We first prove a simpler general upper bound (Theorem 1) and then refine the result by giving
tight bounds for all possible values of s (Theorem 2). The first result says that the strong price of
anarchy is bounded and actually gets better as s increases.
Proof of Theorem 1. We distinguish the following cases:
(a2 = 0.) By definition of `1 and `
∗
1 we have `1 ≤ c1 + `∗1, and also by definition of `∗2 we have
`∗2 ≥ s · c1. Therefore, along with (2) and (3) it holds that `1 ≤ `
∗
2
s + `
∗
1 ≤ 1s + 1.
(a2 > 0.) In this case we use that at least one between (9) or (10) must hold. If (9) holds then:
`1 ≤ `2 − b2 + a2
s
≤ d1 + `∗2 ≤
`∗1
s
+ `∗2 ≤
1
s
+ 1
where the last two inequalities follow by the fact that `∗1 ≥ s · d1 and (2)-(3).
If (10) holds then we use that at least one between (17) or (18) must hold. If (17) holds then
by definition of `1 this can be rewritten as
a1 + a2
s
≤ c1 + c2 .
By adding a1 + a2 on both sides, this is the same as
a1 + a2 +
a1 + a2
s
≤ a1 + a2 + c1 + c2︸ ︷︷ ︸
`1
⇒ a2 ≤ s
s+ 1
`1 .
By (4) and (6) we also have
`1 ≤ 1 + a2
s
and by putting the last two inequalities together we obtain
`1 ≤ 1 + `1
s+ 1
⇔ `1 ≤ 1 + 1
s
.
If (18) holds then we first observe that, by definition, the following identity holds:
`1 = `
∗
1 +
`∗2
s
+
s2 − 1
s2
a2 − b1 + b2
s
− sd1 − d2
s
.
We shall prove that
s2 − 1
s2
a2 − b1 + b2
s
− sd1 − d2
s
≤ 0 (19)
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and thus conclude from (2)-(3) that
`1 ≤ `∗1 +
`∗2
s
≤ 1 + 1
s
.
From (6) and (10) we have
a2 ≤ b2
s− 1 ≤
b1 + b2
s− 1
and plugging into left hand side of (19) we get
s2 − 1
s2
a2 − b1 + b2
s
− sd1 − d2
s
≤ b1 + b2
s2
− sd1 − d2
s
.
Finally, by definition of `2, (18) can be rewritten as
b1 + b2
s2
≤ d1 + d2
s
which implies
b1 + b2
s2
− sd1 − d2
s
≤ d1 + d2
s
− sd1 − d2
s
≤ 0
which proves (19) and concludes the proof of this last case.
3.1 Notation used for the improved upper bound
We shall break the proof into several subcases. First, we consider different intervals for s. Then, for
each interval, we consider the quantities a1, a2, c1, c2 and break the proof into subcases, according
to the fact that some of these quantities are zero or strictly positive (Lemmas 4-8 below). Finally,
in each subcase, use a subset of the SE constraints to obtain the desired bound.
Table 2 shows the subcases and which constraints are used to prove a corresponding bound.
Note that for the chosen constraints, we also specify some weight which essentially says how these
constraints are combined together in the actual proof. We explain this with the following example.
3.1.1 An illustrative example (weighted combination of constraints)
Consider the case 1-2 in Table 2 (second row). In the third column, the four numbers show whether
the four variable a1, a2, c1, c2 are zero or non-zero, where “1” represents non-zero and “∗” represents
non-negative. The last column is the bound we obtain for `1 and thus for the SPoA. Specifically,
in this case we want to prove the following:
Claim 1. If a1 > 0, a2 = 0, and c1 > 0, then `1 ≤ s3+s2+s+1s3+s2+1 .
Proof. First summing all the constraints with the corresponding weights given in columns 4 and 5
of Table 2 (second row):
(2) s
3+s
s3+s2+1
+ (3) s
2+1
s3+s2+1
+ (5) s
2
s3+s2+1
+ (7) 1
s3+s2+1
.
This simplifies as
a1 +
s3+s2+s+1
s4+s3+s
a2 + c1 +
s3+s2+s+1
s3+s2+1
c2 +
s4−1
s3+s2+1
d1 ≤ s3+s2+s+1s3+s2+1 . (20)
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Note that all the weights (column 5) are positive when s in the given interval (column 2), so that
the direction of the inequalities (column 4) remains.
According to columns 2 and 3, we have a2 = 0,
s3+s2+s+1
s3+s2+1
≥ 1 and s4−1
s3+s2+1
≥ 0. This and (20)
imply
`1 = a1 + a2 + c1 + c2 ≤ s
3 + s2 + s+ 1
s3 + s2 + 1
.
We therefore get the bound in column 6.
3.2 The actual proof
We break the proof of Theorem 2 into several lemmas, and prove the upper bound in each of them.
The lemmas are organized depending on the value of a1, a2, c1, c2. Finally, we show that the bounds
of these lemmas are tight (Lemma 9).
Lemma 4. If a1 > 0, then `1 ≤ ˆ`1.
Lemma 5. If a1 = a2 = 0, then `1 ≤ ˆ`1.
Lemma 6. If a1 = 0, a2, c1 > 0, then `1 ≤ ˆ`1.
Lemma 7. If a1 = c1 = c2 = 0 and a2 > 0, then `1 ≤ ˆ`1.
Lemma 8. If a1 = c1 = 0 and a2, c2 > 0, then `1 ≤ ˆ`1.
Lemma 9. The lower bound of SPoA ≥ ˆ`1 is given by the instances in Table 1.
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between the general bound and the bound proved in each of the
these lemmas.
The proofs of these lemmas are based on Table 2. Note that in Table 2, each row has a bound
for `1 in the last column. Since the above illustrative example has already explained how the bounds
are generated, here we mainly focus on the relationship of these bounds with the lemmas.
The index (column 1) of each row in Table 2 encodes the relationship between those bounds (last
column) and how these bounds should be combined to obtain the corresponding lemma. Specifically,
cases separated by “.” are subcases that should take maximum of them due to we aim to measure
the worst performance, while cases separated by “-” are a single case bounded by several different
combinations of constrains that should take minimum of them due to these constrains should hold
at the same time. For instance, we consider three subcases in Lemma 5, since a1 = a2 = 0: Case
5.1 (c1 = 0, c2 > 0), Case 5.2 (c1 > 0, c2 = 0) and Case 5.3 (c1 > 0, c2 > 0), which correspond to
rows 5.1 to 5.3-b in Table 2. The bound for Case 5.3 is the minimum of the bounds of 5.3-a and
5.3-b. Finally, the maximum of the bounds of the three subcases give the bound for Lemma 5, i.e.,
max
{
1, 1s , min{2(s+1)s+2 , s+2s+1}
}
(orange line of Figure 4c).
The proofs of Lemmas 4-9 are given in full detail in Appendixes A.1 and A.2.
4 Price of Anarchy
In this section we prove the bounds on the PoA in Theorem 3. Suppose the smallest jobs in
a1, a2, c1, c2 are a1
′, a2′, c1′, c2′ respectively. To guarantee NE, it must hold that no single job in
machine 1 can improve by moving to machine 2, so that (5), (6), (7) and (8) are also true for NE
since a1
′ ≤ a1, a2′ ≤ a2, c1′ ≤ c1 and c2′ ≤ c2. Like in the analysis of the SPoA, we assume without
9
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Figure 4: Proof of Theorem 2.
Table 1: Lower bound for SPoA.
s a2 b2 c2 d1 d2 LB (= `1) `2
LB1 [0, s1]
s3+s2
s3+2
s
s3+2
s+1
s3+2
s2−1
s3+2
s3−s2−s+2
s3+2
s3+s2+s+1
s3+2
s3+1
s3+2
LB2 [s1, s2]
s2+s
2s+1
s2
2s+1
s+1
2s+1 0
s
2s+1
s2+2s+1
2s+1
s2+s
2s+1
LB3 [s2, s3] 1 s− 1 1s 0 2− s s+1s 1
LB4 [s3, s4]
s2/(s−1)
s2+1
s2
s2+1
s2−s+1
s2+1
0 1
s2+1
s3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1 1
LB5 [s4, s5]
s
2
s
2
1
2 0
2−s
2
s+1
2 1
LB6 [s5, s6]
1
s−1 1
s−1
s 0 0
s2−s+1
s2−s 1
LB7 [s6, s7]
s2
2s−1 0 0
(s−1)2
2s−1
s−1
2s−1
s2
2s−1
s2−s
2s−1
LB8 [s7,∞] s+1s 0 0 1s s
2−s−1
s2
s+1
s
s2−1
s2
∗Note that a1 = b1 = c1 = 0, and a2, b2, c2, d1, d2 each represent a single job here.
loss of generality that opt = 1, and thus (2) and (3) hold. We use these six constraints to prove
Theorem 3.
It is easy to see that if at most one of a1, a2, c1, c2 is nonzero, then `1 ≤ s, thus here we only
discuss the cases where at least two of them are nonzero. Similar to the proof of SPoA the proofs
of these lemmas are based on last four rows of Table 2.
Lemma 10. If a2 = 0, then `1 ≤ s3+s2+s+1s2+s+1 .
Lemma 11. If a2 > 0 and c2 = 0, then `1 ≤ s3+s2+s+1s2+s+1 .
Lemma 12. If a2 > 0 and c2 > 0, then `1 ≤ s3+s2+s+1s2+s+1 .
Lemma 13. The lower bound of PoA is achieved by the following case,
a2 =
s3+s2
s2+s+1
, b1 =
1
s2+s+1
, b2 =
s3
s2+s+1
, c2 =
s+1
s2+s+1
,
and a1 = c1 = d1 = d2 = 0.
Lemmas 10-13 (proofs see Appendix A.3) complete the proof of Theorem 3.
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5 Conclusion and open questions
In this work, we have analyzed both the price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy on a
simple though natural model of two machines in which each job has its own favorite machine, and
the other machine is s times slower machine. The model and the results extend the case of two
related machines with speed ratio s [13]. In particular, we provide exact bounds on PoA and SPoA
for all values of s. On the one hand, this allows us to compare with the same bounds for two related
machines (see Figure 2). On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first
studies which considers in the analysis the processing time ratio between different machines (with
the exception of [13]). Prior work mainly focused on the asymptotic on the number of machines
(resources) or/and number of jobs (users). Instead, the loss of efficiency due to selfish behavior is
perhaps also caused by the presence of different resources, even when the latter are few.
Unlike for two related machines, in our setting the PoA grows with s and thus the influence of
coalitions and the resulting SPoA is more evident. Note for example that the SPoA ≤ φ =
√
5+1
2 '
1.618 and this bound is attained for s = φ exactly like for two related machines (see Figure 1). Also,
for sufficiently large s, the two problems have the exact same SPoA, though the PoA is very much
different.
It is natural to study the PoA and SPoA depending on the specific speed ratio, or processing
time ratio. In that sense, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to more machines in the
favorite machines setting [7]. There, an important parameter is also the minimum number k of
favorite machines per job. The case k = 1 is perhaps interesting as, in the online setting, this gives
a problem which is as difficult as the more general unrelated machines. Is it possible to characterize
the PoA and the SPoA in this setting for any s? Do these bounds improve for larger k? Another
interesting restriction would be the case of unit-size jobs, which means that each job has processing
time 1 or s. Such two-values restrictions have been studied in the mechanism design setting with
selfish machines [23, 3], where players are machines and they possibly speculate on their true cost.
Considering other well studied solution concepts would also be interesting, including sequential PoA
[24, 6, 12, 19], approximate SPoA [14], and the price of stochastic anarchy [10].
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Table 2: Subcases to prove Lemmas 4-8 and Lemmas 11-12
Lemma.subcases s a1, a2, c1, c2 Constrains needed Weight coefficient Bounds
4.1 [1,∞] 1, 0, 0, ∗ (2) {1} 1
4.2 [1,∞] 1, 0, 1, ∗ (2), (3), (5), (7) {s3+s;s2+1;s2;1}
s3+s2+1
s3+s2+s+1
s3+s2+1
4.3-a [1,
√
2] 1, 1, 0, ∗ (2), (3), (5), (6) {2s; 2; s2; 2− s2} · 1s+2 2(s+1)s+2
4.3-b [
√
2,∞] 1, 1, 0, ∗ (2), (3), (4), (5) {s2;s;s(s2−2);s(s2−1)}
s3−s+1
s(s2+s−1)
s3−s+1
4.3-c [1,∞] 1, 1, 0, ∗ (3), (5), (6) {2s; s; s} · 12s−1 2s2s−1
4.4-a [1, 1.272] 1, 1, 1, ∗ (2), (3), (5), (6), (7) {2s3+s;2s2+1;s4;−s4+s2+1;s2}
s3+2s2+s+1
2s3+2s2+s+1
s3+2s2+s+1
4.4-b [1.272,∞] 1, 1, 1, ∗ (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) {s3;s2;s4−s2−1;s2(s2−1);s2−1}
s4+s−1
s4+s3−1
s4+s−1
5.1 [1,∞] 0, 0, 0, 1 (2) {1} 1
5.2 [1,∞] 0, 0, 1, 0 (3) {1/s} 1/s
5.3-a [1,∞] 0, 0, 1, 1 (2), (3), (7), (8) {2s; 2; 1; 1} · 1s+2 2(s+1)s+2
5.3-b [1,∞] 0, 0, 1, 1 (2), (3), (7) {s; 2; 1} · 1s+1 s+2s+1
6.1-a [1,∞] 0, 1, 1, 0 (3), (4), (7) {s2;s2−1;s2−1}
s2+s−1
2s2−1
s2+s−1
6.1-b.(9) [1.272,∞] 0, 1, 1, 0 (2), (3), (4), (7), (9) {s3;s4;s4−s2−1;s4−1;s4−s2}
2s4−s2+s−1
2s4+s3−s2−1
2s4−s2+s−1
6.1-b.(10) [1.272,∞] 0, 1, 1, 0 (3), (6), (10) {s2−s+1;(s−1)2(s+1);s(s2−1)}
s3−2s2+s+1
s2−s+1
s3−2s2+s+1
6.2-a.(15) [1,∞] 0, 1, 1, 1 (4), (6), (7), (15) {s2; s2 − 1; 1; 1} · 1
s2−s+1
s2
s2−s+1
6.2-a.(16) [1,∞] 0, 1, 1, 1 (4), (6), (8), (16) {s2−s+2;s2;1;s}
s2−s+1
s2−s+2
s2−s+1
6.2-b [1,
√
2] 0, 1, 1, 1 (2), (3), (6), (7), (8) {s(s
2+2);s2+2;2−s2;s2;s2}
s2+2s+2
s3+s2+2s+2
s2+2s+2
6.2-c [
√
2,∞] 0, 1, 1, 1 (2), (3), (4), (7) {s;s2;s2−2;s2−1}
s2+s−1
2s2+s−2
s2+s−1
7-a [1, 1+
√
5
2 ] 0, 1, 0, 0 (3) {s} s
7-b.(9)-a [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 (2), (3), (6), (9) {s; s2; 1; s2 − 1} · 1
s2
1 + 1s
7-b.(9)-b.(13)-a [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 (2), (3), (9), (13) {s2;s(s2−1);s(s2−1);s}
s3−1
s(s2+s−1)
s3−1
7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b.(11) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 (3), (4), (9), (11) { s2s−1 ; s2s−1 ; s2s−1 ; s2s−1} 2s2s−1
7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b.(12) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 (2), (9), (12), (13) {s2;s2−s;s2−s;s2}
2s2−3s+1
s2
2s2−3s+1
7-b.(9)-b.(14) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 (3), (6), (14) {s2; s; s} · 12s−1 s
2
2s−1
7-b.(10) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 0 – – –
8.(17)-a [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (3), (6), (17) {s(s+1);s+1;s+1;s2/(s−1)}2s+1 (s+1)
2
2s+1
8.(17)-b [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (4), (6), (17) { s+1s ; s+1s ; 1(s−1)s} 1 + 1s
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Table 2: (continued)
8.(17)-c.(9) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (3), (6), (8), (9) {s2+1;s3+s;1/s;s;s3−1/s}
s3+s+1
s3+s2+s+1
s3+s+1
8.(17)-c.(10)-a [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (4), (6), (10) { s2−s+1(s−1)s ; ss−1 ; 1s−1} s
2−s+1
(s−1)s
8.(17)-c.(10)-b.(13) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (13), (17) { s+12 ; s+12s ; s
2+1
2(s−1)s} s+12
8.(17)-c.(10)-b.(14) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (4), (6), (10), (14) {(s−1)(s2+1);s;s(s2+1);s3+s−1;1}
s3−s2+s−1
s3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1
8.(18)-a.(11) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (3), (18), (11) {s;s2+s+1;s2/(s−1);s+1}2s+1 (s+1)
2
2s+1
8.(18)-a.(12) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (3), (6), (8), (12) {s3+s;s2+1;s3+s2−s;s+1−
1
s
;s3− 1
s
}
s3+2
s3+s2+s+1
s3+2
8.(18)-b.(9) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (2), (3), (6), (8), (9) {s2+1;s3+s;1/s;s;s3−1/s}
s3+s+1
s3+s2+s+1
s3+s+1
8.(18)-b.(10) [1,∞] 0, 1, 0, 1 (4), (6), (10), (18) {s2; s(s+1); s+1; 1/(s−1)}
s2−1
s2
s2−1
11.1-a [1,
√
2] 1, 1, ∗, 0 (2), (3), (5), (6) {2s; 2; s2; 2− s2} · 1s+2 2(s+1)s+2
11.1-b [
√
2,∞] 1, 1, ∗, 0 (2), (3), (5) {s2; s(s2 − 1); s} · 1
s2+s−1 s
11.2 [1,∞] 0, 1, 1, 0 (2), (3), (7) {s(s2−1);s2;s2−1}
s2+s−1 s
12 [1,∞] ∗, 1, ∗, 1 (2), (3), (6), (8) {s3+s;s2+1;1; s2}
s2+s+1
s3+s2+s+1
s2+s+1
Note: “∗” means either 0 or 1 in the third column.15
A Postponed Proofs
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 4-8
Proof of Lemma 4. Since a1 > 0, we consider four subcases: Case 4.1 (a2, c1 = 0), Case 4.2 (a2 =
0, c1 > 0), Case 4.3 (a2 > 0, c1 = 0) and Case 4.4 (a2, c1 > 0), which correspond to rows 4.1 to 4.4-b
in Table 2.
The bound for Case 4.3 is the minimum of the bounds of 4.3-a, 4.3-b and 4.3-c. Similarly, the
bound for Case 4.4 is the minimum of the bounds of 4.4-a and 4.4-b. Finally, the maximum of the
bounds of the four subcases give the bound for this lemma. These 4 subcases are summed up in
Figure 4b (orange line).
Proof of Lemma 5. Since a1 = a2 = 0, we consider three subcases: Case 5.1 (c1 = 0, c2 > 0),
Case 5.2 (c1 > 0, c2 = 0) and Case 5.3 (c1 > 0, c2 > 0), which correspond to rows 5.1 to 5.3-b in
Table 2.
The bound for Case 5.3 is the minimum of the bounds of 5.3-a and 5.3-b. Finally, the maximum
of the bounds of the three subcases give the bound for this lemma. These 3 subcases are summed
up in Figure 4c (orange line).
Proof of Lemma 6. Since a1 = 0, a2, c1 > 0, we consider two subcases: Case 6.1 (c2 = 0) and Case
6.2 (c2 > 0), which correspond to rows 6.1-a to 6.2-c in Table 2.
The bound for Case 6.1 is the minimum of the bounds of 6.1-a and 6.1-b, where 6.1-b is the
maximum of the bounds of 6.1-b.(9) and 6.1-b.(10). Note that it only needs one of constraints (9)
and (10) holds, thus we take the maximum of 6.1-b.(9) and 6.1-b.(10). The bound for Case 6.2 is the
minimum of the bounds of 6.2-a, 6.2-b, 6.2-c, where 6.2-a is the maximum of the bounds of 6.2-a.(15)
and 6.2-a.(16). Finally, the maximum of the bounds of the two subcases give the bound for this
lemma. These 2 subcases are summed up in Figure 4d.
Proof of Lemma 7. This lemma considers the case a1 = c1 = c2 = 0 and a2 > 0, which correspond
to rows 7-a to 7-b.(10) in Table 2.
Similar as the above proofs, the bound for this case is the minimum of the bounds of 7-a and 7-b,
where 7-b is the maximum of the bounds of 7-b.(9) and 7-b.(10). Furthermore, the bound of 7-b.(9) is
the minimum of the bounds of 7-b.(9)-a and 7-b.(9)-b, where 7-b.(9)-b is the maximum of 7-b.(9)-b.(13)
and 7-b.(9)-b.(14). Moreover 7-b.(9)-b.(13) is the minimum of 7-b.(9)-b.(13)-a and 7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b,
where 7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b is the maximum of 7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b.(11) and 7-b.(9)-b.(13)-b.(12). Finally, the
bounds give the bound for this lemma, which is shown in Figure 4e.
Proof of Lemma 8. This lemma consider the case a1 = c1 = 0 and a2, c2 > 0, which correspond to
rows 8.(17)-a to 8.(18)-b.(10) in Table 2.
Similar as the above proofs, the bound for this case is the maximum of the bounds of 8.(17) and
8.(18), where 8.(17) is the minimum of 8.(17)-a, 8.(17)-b and 8.(17)-c, and 8.(18) is the minimum
of 8.(18)-a and 8.(18)-b. Furthermore, the bound of 8.(17)-c is the maximum of the bounds of
8.(17)-c.(9) and 8.(17)-c.(10), where 8.(17)-c.(10) is the minimum of 8.(17)-c.(10)-a and 8.(17)-c.(10)-b
where 8.(17)-c.(10)-b is the maximum of 8.(17)-c.(10)-b.(13) and 8.(17)-c.(10)-b.(14). Besides, the
bound of 8.(18)-a is the maximum of bounds of 8.(18)-a.(11) and 8.(18)-a.(12), and 8.(18)-b is the
maximum of 8.(18)-b.(9) and 8.(18)-b.(10). Finally, the bounds give the bound for this lemma,
which is shown in Figure 4f.
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A.2 Proof of lower bound (Lemma 9)
Table 1 gives instances that match all the bounds of Theorem 2. Each instance is represented by
the setting of Figure 3 and each symbol (e.g. a1, a2, b1 . . . ) represents at most one job.
Proposition 14. The optimal makespan of each instance of Table 1 is at most 1.
Proof. It is easy to see that, for every instance of Table 1, the optimum schedule shown in
Figure 3 satisfies max{`∗1, `∗2} ≤ 1. Hence we can have opt ≤ 1 even though the above schedule
is not guaranteed to be a SE, because the optimal SE can only have better makespan than that
schedule.
Proposition 15. Each schedule of Table 1 is a NE.
Proof. Because `1 ≥ `2, no job in machine 2 can reduce its cost by moving to machine 1. Thus we
only need to check that if there is no single job in machine 1 would benefit from moving to machine
2.
LB1 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s3+s2+s+1
s3+2
= `1.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = s
3+s2+s+1
s3+2
= `1.
LB2 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s2+2s+1
2s+1 = `1.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = 2s
2+2s
2s+1 ≥ `1 = s
2+2s+1
2s+1 .
LB3 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s+1
s = `1.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = 2 ≥ `1 = s+1s .
LB4 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1 = `1.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = s
4−s3+s2−1
s3−s2+s−1 ≥ `1 = s
3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1 by s ≥ s3 ≈ 1.755.
LB5 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
3
2 ≥ `1 = s+12 by s ≤ s5 = 2.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = s+22 ≥ `1 = s+12 .
LB6 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s2−s+1
s2−s = `1.
If c2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + c2 · s = s ≥ `1 = s
2−s+1
s2−s by s ≥ s5 = 2.
LB7 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s =
s2
2s−1 = `1.
LB8 If a2 moves to machine 2, `
′
2 = `2 + a2/s = 2 ≥ `1 = s+1s .
According to Proposition 15 we know that no single job can reduce its cost by moving to other
machine. It also holds that
Proposition 16 (Epstein [13]). Given a schedule on two machines which is a NE, if this schedule
is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can reduce its cost consists of at least one job
of each one of the machines.
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Proposition 17. If a schedule of Table 1 is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can
reduce its cost must consist of job a2.
Proof. Because good job will become bad job after swap, if the coalition consists of only good jobs,
it holds that `′1 + `′2 ≥ `1 + `2. Thus at least one of the cost of the jobs will get worse after swap.
Therefore, if a schedule is not a SE, then a coalition of jobs where every job can reduce its cost
must consist of at least one bad job.
For LB7 and LB8, a2 is in the coalition for sure, since a2 is the only good job. For other instances
in Table 1, if a2 is not in the coalition then b2 must in it according to Proposition 16. Next we will
show that a2 + b2/s ≥ `2 for every instance of them, so that if b2 is in the coalition then b2 will not
benefit from moving to machine 1. Thus a2 must be in the coalition. For LB1 to LB3, we have
a2 ≥ `2 thus a2 + b2/s ≥ `2 holds. For LB4, a2 + b2/s = 2s2−ss3−s2+s−1 ≥ `2 = 1 by s ≤ s4. For LB5,
a2 + b2/s =
s
2 +
1
2 ≥ `2 = 1. For LB6, a2 + b2/s = 1s−1 + 1s ≥ `2 = 1 by s ≤ s6 ≈ 2.154.
Proposition 18. For any instance of Table 1, if a2 is the only job of machine 1 that in a coalition
of jobs, these jobs cannot reduce their costs at the same time.
Proof. According to Proposition 16, if a2 is the only job of machine 1 that in a coalition of jobs,
there must be some job of machine 2 in this coalition. Thus this proposition says there are no such
a a2-{∗} swap that all these jobs can benefit simultaneously, where {∗} is any subset of jobs of
machine 2. We prove this for the 8 instances of Table 1 one by one.
LB1 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stays, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s =
s+2
s3+2
≥ `2 = s3+1s3+2 by s ≤ s1 ≈ 1.325;
No a2-d1 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + d1 · s = s
3+1
s3+2
= `2;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + d2 · s = s
4−s3−s2+3s+1
s3+2
> `2 =
s3+1
s3+2
by s ≤ s1.
LB2 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stays, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s = 1 ≥ `2 = s
2+s
2s+1 by s ≤ s2 ≈ 1.618;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + d2 · s = s
2+s+1
2s+1 > `2 =
s2+s
2s+1 .
LB3 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stays, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s = 1 = `2;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + d2 · s = 1s + 2s− s2 > `2 = 1 by s ≤ s3 ≈ 1.755.
LB4 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stays, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s = 1 = `2;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + d2 · s = 1 = `2.
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LB5 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stay, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s = 1 = `2;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
2 = b2 + a2/s = `1 =
s+1
2 ;
No a2-{b2, d2} swap: `′1 = c2 + b2/s+ d2 · s = −s
2+2s+2
2 ≥ `2 = 1.
LB6 In this case a2 moves to machine 2 and c2 stays, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in
machine 2 can benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-b2 swap: `
′
1 = c2 + b2/s = 1 = `2.
LB7 In this case a2 moves to machine 2, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in machine 2 can
benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-d1 swap: `
′
1 = d1 · s = s(s−1)
2
2s−1 ≥ `2 = s
2−s
2s−1 by s ≥ s6 ≈ 2.154;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = d2 · s = s
2−s
2s−1 = `2.
LB8 In this case a2 moves to machine 2, it holds that no job (or subset of jobs) in machine 2 can
benefit from moving to machine 1, because
No a2-d1 swap: `
′
1 = d1 · s = 1 ≥ `2 = s
2−1
s2
;
No a2-d2 swap: `
′
1 = d2 · s = s
2−s−1
s ≥ `2 = s
2−1
s2
by s ≥ s7 ≈ 2.247.
Lemma 19. Each schedule of Table 1 is a SE.
Proof. According to Propositions 17 and 18, we know that schedules of LB7 and LB8 are SE, since
a2 is the only job in machine 1. For LB1 to LB6, we will prove there is no such coalition of jobs can
reduce their costs at the same time:
LB1 According to Proposition 17, we only need to consider the case both a2 and c2 of machine 1
are in the coalition. However, we have
No {a2, c2}-{b2, d2} swap: `′2 = d1 + a2/s+ c2 · s = 3s
2+2s−1
s3+2
≥ `1 = s3+s2+s+1s3+2 by s ≤ s1.
Since s
2−1
s3+2
≤ s3−s2−s+2
s3+2
≤ s
s3+2
by s ≤ s1, i.e., d1 ≤ d2 ≤ b2, we can know that a2 and c2 will
not benefit even if the smallest job d1 of machine 2 stays still. Thus all jobs in machine 2
should be in the coalition. Since
No {a2, c2}-{b2, d1, d2} swap: `′1 = b2/s+ d1 · s+ d2 · s = s
4−s2+s+1
s3+2
≥ `2 = s3+1s3+2 by s ≤ s1,
we know that there is no such coalition of jobs that every job can reduce its cost by deviating
simultaneously.
LB2 Similar as the former case, we consider the case both a2 and c2 are in the coalition. We get
the same result by the fact that
No {a2, c2}-{∗} swap: `′2 ≥ a2/s+ c2 · s = s
2+2s+1
2s+1 = `1.
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LB3 Considering the case both a2 and c2 are in the coalition, we have that
No {a2, c2}-{∗} swap: `′2 ≥ a2/s+ c2 · s = s+1s = `1.
LB4 Considering the case both a2 and c2 are in the coalition, we have that
No {a2, c2}-{∗} swap: `′2 ≥ a2/s+ c2 · s = s
4−ss3+2s2
s3−s2+s−1 ≥ `1 = s
3−s2+2s−1
s3−s2+s−1 by s ≥ s3 ≈ 1.755.
LB5 Considering the case both a2 and c2 are in the coalition, we have that
No {a2, c2}-{∗} swap: `′2 ≥ a2/s+ c2 · s = s+12 = `1.
LB6 Considering the case both a2 and c2 are in the coalition, we have that
No {a2, c2}-{∗} swap: `′2 ≥ a2/s+ c2 · s = 1s2−s + s− 1 ≥ `1 = s
2−s+1
s2−s by s ≥ s5 = 2.
A.3 Proofs of Lemmas 10-13
Proof of Lemma 10. Rows 4.1, 4.2 and 5.4-a in Table 2 cover all the cases. Since each of the 3
bounds is below the claimed bound s
3+s2+s+1
s2+s+1
, the lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 11. Similar to the proof of SPoA, according to rows 11.1-a to 11.2 of Table 2 we
have
max
{
min
{2(s+ 1)
s+ 2
, s
}
, s
}
≤ s
3 + s2 + s+ 1
s2 + s+ 1
for s ≥ 1, thus the lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 12. The bound of row 12 of Table 2 implies this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 13. We know that
`1 = a2 + c2 =
s3 + s2 + s+ 1
s2 + s+ 1
,
`2 = b1 + b2 =
s3 + 1
s2 + s+ 1
.
If a2 goes to machine 2, the cost of a2 becomes
`′2 = `2 + a2/s =
s3 + s2 + s+ 1
s2 + s+ 1
.
Similarly, if c2 goes to machine 2, the cost of c2 becomes
`′2 = `2 + c2 · s =
s3 + s2 + s+ 1
s2 + s+ 1
.
Thus the schedule is a NE.
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